tiistai 29. syyskuuta 2015

What justifies scientism?

Scientism is an anti-philosophical position. It does not leave room for anything that could still be called philosophy . So why should we accept such a "radical" position? Here are some reasons:

1. Scientism is a coherent position. It is at least another perfectly respectable option on the table. There shouldn't be any more disagreement about this than there is disagreement about the fact that both humean and non-humean accounts of laws of nature are coherent.

2. Scientists can do good science without knowing anything about contemporary philosophy. Philosophy is unnecessary. Science works. Scientists do not need to solve any artificial problems invented by philosophers, such as the "problem" of induction or the debate between realists and antirealists. There may be some important, more abstract higher-level questions in science, but they are intra-scientific, and theoretical science is enough to answer them.

3. Pre-scientific intuitions and hunches are unreliable, and philosophers do not have any other source of evidence. It is all just epistemically worthless intuition mongering.

4. The core areas of philosophy, metaphysics and epistemology, can be replaced by science. If they can be replaced by science, they should, since science has clear practical benefits and much better epistemic credentials.

5. Philosophy wouldn't have any worth even if somehow, magically, philosophers would be able to organize their varying, culturally specific "expert" intuitions into a consistent set, solve their problems, and converge on universal and eternal philosophical truths.

When we have a coherent scientistic option on the table, and there are no good positive reasons to think that philosophy is necessary, useful, or epistemically worthwhile, the reasonable move is to just grab it, without waiting for any "deeper" justification or a final knock-down argument.

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