"Those who argue that metaphysics uses a problematic methodology to make claims about subjects better covered by natural science get the situation exactly the wrong way around: metaphysics has a distinctive subject matter, not a distinctive methodology. The questions metaphysicians address are different from those of scientists, but the methods employed to develop and select theories are similar." (L. A. Paul, Metaphysics as modeling: the handmaiden's tale, 2012)
The philosophers of science Gordon Belot and James Woodward do not buy it:
"If ontology follows a version of the scientific method, the relevant version is a degenerate case - and, I think, we should be suspicious of the credentials of its output." (Belot: Healey, Method and Metaphysics, Pacific APA)
"Papers appearing in Science, Nature or the Physical Review, even when they report the discovery of novel 'entities' or structures such as the Higgs boson ... are very, very different in terms of content, argumentation, and evidence appealed to than what is found in [analytic metaphysics]." (Woodward: Methodology, ontology, and interventionism, 2014)
"If standard philosophical accounts of theory-testing, evidence, explanation and so on recognize no sharp difference between [empirical science and analytic metaphysics] ... that reflects the inadequacy of those standard philosophical accounts rather than indicating that [analytic metaphysics] is just ordinary science, pursued at a higher level of abstraction." (ibid.)
I do not buy it either. If analytic metaphysicians really do employ scientific methods, then why do they so often end up making claims that are empirically false according to current science? And why don't scientists feel any need to study analytic metaphysics? After all, you would except them to be highly interested in a field of inquiry that revealed, using scientific methods, the most general or fundamental facts about reality!
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