I have never understood why some people who don't like analytic metaphysics still accept analytic epistemology. I do not see much qualitative difference between them (and please do not say that analytic epistemology gets to stay because it is somehow "normative").
"When we throw analytic metaphysics on the scrap-heap of misguided effort, most of analytic epistemology goes with it." (Don Ross: Will scientific philosophy still be philosophy? 2013)
"Much of our critique of the role of intuitions in metaphysics applies to other areas of philosophy. Weatherson (2003) argues against the weight that has been given to intuitions in epistemology post-Gettier. He defends the traditional conceptual analysis of knowledge against Gettier on this basis. From our perspective, the role of intuitions in that analysis is just as suspect as their role in undermining it." (James Ladyman and Don Ross: Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, 2007)
Ei kommentteja:
Lähetä kommentti