How to reduce all philosophical questions to empirical questions

Contemporary philosophers often make a priori claims about phenomena that are already or could be studied by empirical science. James Ladyman and Don Ross argue in their book Every Thing Must Go (2007) that analytic metaphysicians make assumptions about the nature of physical reality that are simply false according to contemporary physics. Bence Nanay argues that philosophy of action is not informed by the cognitive neuroscience of action even though both fields have partly the same subject matter (Experimental Philosophy and Naturalism, 2015). The training of philosophers makes them prone to this kind of misapplication of armchair methods:

"Philosophers who do not possess empirical knowledge of relevance to their research often make assumptions that are in fact empirical without their noticing. Also, they wrongly conceptualize empirical problems as if they were solvable from the armchair. ... Empirical issues repeatedly crop up in philosophy. Philosophers who subscribe to the erroneous doctrine that they do not, and who do not master the relevant empirical discipline, are bound to fail to notice when they pass into its territory. Instead, they will try to solve the problems in question by means of their standard armchair methods." (Stefan Schubert: Ernest Gellner's Words and Things: A Case Study of Empirical Philosophy, 2015)

Schubert's example is the linguistic philosophy movement, where philosophers made implicitly sociological and anthropological claims as if those claims belonged to a priori philosophy.

Most philosophers - with the exception of the most foolhardy crackpots - accept that whenever philosophy and science conflict, philosophy should give way. That is, philosophy should at least be compatible with science. I of course think that mere compatibility or even "informedness" is not enough and that philosophy should be completely replaced (or displaced) by science.

At first glance, accepting epistemic verificationism would seem to leave many questions of philosophy unanswered (and stop people wasting their time on epistemically worthless projects). But maybe it is possible to re-formulate all problems of, say, analytic metaphysics and epistemology as empirical questions. We could just re-interpret intuition-mongering metaphysicians and epistemologists as doing, without them realizing it, some kind of naive introspective auto-anthropology, as Daniel Dennett, J. D. Trout and Michael Bishop have suggested:

"[the projects of analytic metaphysics often] strike me as naive naive auto-athropology since the participants in this research seem to be convinced that their program actually gets at something true, not just believed-true by a particular subclass of human beings (Anglophone philosophers of the analytic metaphysics persuasion). ... I've asked a number of analytic metaphysicians whether they can distinguish their enterprise from naive auto-anthropology of their clan, and have not yet received any compelling answers." (Dennett: Kinds of Things - Towards a Bestiary of the Manifest Image, 2013)

"[Standard Analytic Epistemology] is actually an odd kind of cultural anthropology: building theories that describe how privileged (mostly) Westerners with Ph.D.s in Philosophy engage in epistemic assessment." (Bishop and Trout: Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, 2005)

After this re-interpretation, we could just fire all metaphysicians and epistemologists and hand their jobs over to psychologists and anthropologists:

"If philosophers want an account that mimics their epistemological judgments, all we would need is a psychologist who is willing to model our judgments ... . Indeed, if philosophers really want to begin their epistemological musings with a descriptive core that accurately accounts for their judgments about knowledge or justification, they would save a lot of time, energy, and expense by employing a few psychology graduate students." (ibid.)

I wouldn't keep metaphysicians and epistemologists even as research subjects. It would be more interesting to get more generalizable results about how humans think, although it could be valuable to take analytic philosophers as case studies in epistemic pathology.