Should we democratize philosophy?

Traditional philosophy is based on the intuitions of the few (well-off Westerners with PhDs in philosophy). Experimental philosophy is based on the intuitions of the many (ordinary people from different backgrounds). So perhaps we need a democratic revolution carried out by experimental philosophers, the only remnant of the old tyranny being a charred armchair. Justin Sytsma and Jonathan Livengood, who have written a new book on experimental philosophy, do not like this way of putting the issue:

"The image of the burning armchair no doubt served a sociological purpose - it drew a sharp line in the sand, polarized positions, and worked up fervor. ... But such divisive rhetoric can also create problems. ... The danger is that we will come to think of non-experimental philosophy as an inherited, tyrannical tradition based on proclamations (intuitions) delivered by those in power, and experimental philosophy as seeking to undermine those proclamations in favor of a new, more democratically determined set of decrees." (The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy, 2015)

First of all, there cannot be anything tyrannical about traditional philosophy since it's debates are nothing but "implicit legislation of language by a group of people whose orders have no prospect of being followed" (Don Ross: A most rare achievement, 2015, my emphasis). Philosophers simply do not have the requisite power in today's science-centered culture. Traditional philosophy is, at most, a wannabe tyranny. Some philosophers do think that their "expert" intuitions should be privileged over those of ordinary people (read this). They suffer from a severe case of the illusion of expertise.

In any case, to me the only reason to probe the intuitions of a larger group of people is to check if some allegedly common-sensical view actually is part of common sense. Intuitions about X are not and will not become evidence about the nature of X, no matter how many people's intuitions we probe.

In order to learn about the nature of X, we need to study X directly, using empirical methods, instead of studying it indirectly by asking people how they think about X (whether or not there even is an X as a homogeneous "natural kind" is itself an empirical question).

Studying how people think about X or what kinds of cognitive processes generate their intuitions about X, if it is done responsibly, is just ordinary social and cognitive science. No need to call it any kind of philosophy. And social and cognitive scientists already understand that we need a large sample before we can make reliable generalizations.


So no, we should not democratize the study of reality (concepts, if they exist, are part of reality too). In matters epistemic, science has absolute and exclusive authority. What we need is a tyranny of science.