Philosophy of science is just as bad as analytic metaphysics

I recently attended a philosophy of science and an analytic metaphysics conference, with plenty of big-name speakers at both. I couldn't detect any qualitative difference between them, methodologically speaking. Sure, the philosophers of science talked about science, but they merely mentioned it. They didn't go into the nitty-gritty details of scientific results and practices. Nobody presented original empirical results. Nobody had used empirical methods, such as ethnographic field observations and interviews, to reach their conclusions. Nobody made contributions to cutting-edge theoretical science. Basically, it was all just armchair philosophizing. One can hardly call these people naturalists. If a "naturalistic turn" has taken place in recent decades, I didn't notice any signs of it. It is just empty hype.

Philosophers of science shouldn't feel superior to analytic metaphysicians. They are doing the same thing: analyzing concepts, pumping intuitions, not using rigorous empirical or mathematical methods, not making any contributions to our knowledge about anything.

What are analytic metaphysicians doing? Sitting in their armchairs, philosophizing about persistence, composition, identity, properties, states of affairs, truth-makers, time, laws, and emergence.

What are philosophers of science doing? Sitting in their armchairs, philosophizing about evidence, observation, representation, realism, spacetime, biological kinds, probability, theory-change, and explanation.

Just because the concepts of philosophy of science have something to do with science does not mean that philosophy of science itself is somehow more scientific or respectable than analytic metaphysics. Intuition mongering about the nature of scientific explanation is just as unscientific as intuition mongering about the nature of mind.

What are important philosophers of science such as Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon doing? Intuition mongering:

"[Kitcher] speculates about what scientists would answer when presented with a set of derivations and a corresponding question. He did not actually interview a representative sample of scientists. The result is that the dispute cannot be settled: both Hempel and Kitcher claim that if one would consult scientists, that would result in evidence supporting their hypotheses. They cannot both be right. ... [Kitcher] has not surveyed a large sample of scientists of various disciplines, in order to investigate what their views on understanding are.  

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Arguments for the descriptive claim [that scientists seek causal-mechanical explanations] are missing ... [Salmon] should not have set himself descriptive aims that require large scale empirical research for which philosophers do not have the (financial) resources and often not the methodological skills. 

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[They] don't argue for their normative claims either." (Erik Weber, Leen De Vreese and Jeroen Van Bouwel: ch. How to Study Scientific Explanation? in Scientific Explanation, 2013)